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Abstract
This article presents a detailed analysis of the loan moratoria. The first part of the 
article describes the characteristics of the five types of moratoria and how the numbers 
of applications made and moratoria granted have evolved to date. It then outlines the 
status of the existing moratoria and the classification of loans whose moratoria have 
expired. In the second part of the article, an econometric analysis is performed to 
determine the impact of borrower and bank characteristics on the probability of loans 
being subject to moratoria, on the type and duration of the moratoria and on the 
classification of loans when the moratoria have expired. The results suggest that 
vulnerable households, those in regions most affected by the pandemic and lower 
income households are generally subject to legislative moratoria for longer or are more 
likely to transfer to non-legislative moratoria when the former expire. They also suggest 
that, when the moratoria expire, these households’ loans are more likely to be classified 
as Stage 2 (a significant increase in credit risk) or non-performing.
1 Introduction
One year on from the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is still having a very 
significant contractionary impact in Spain (and worldwide). In an endeavour to 
mitigate, insofar as possible, this negative shock, from both an economic and a 
social standpoint, various support measures were introduced in Spain for firms, 
workers, households and vulnerable groups. Loan moratoria – which suspend 
repayment of principal or payment of interest on various types of loans for a specific 
period – are one such measure.
In particular, loan moratoria have enabled individuals to defer their loan payment 
commitments. They have also provided additional support for the productive sectors 
most sensitive to the pandemic – by way of the tourism and transport sector moratoria 
– and have thus helped mitigate economic agents’ liquidity problems. Yet the positive 
effects of the loan moratoria should not be allowed to mask other possible side 
effects of their implementation: they could undermine the payment culture, give rise 
to moral hazard or hold default rates at artificially low levels. For this reason, moratoria 
must be used prudently, and how they evolve and the effects they produce must be 
subject to continuous oversight and monitoring.
To date, five different types of loan moratoria have been approved, applicable to 
different types of loans and borrowers, according to the requirements and conditions 
set out in the corresponding Royal Decree-Laws (hereafter, RDLs).
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The first, RDL 8/2020 on extraordinary urgent measures to address the economic 
and social impact of COVID-19, approved on 17  March 2020, introduced the 
legislative moratorium for mortgage loans for individuals.1 It was followed, on 
31 March 2020, by RDL 11/2020 adopting supplementary urgent economic and 
social measures to address the impact of COVID-19, which introduced the 
moratorium for non-mortgage loans (including consumer credit). Essentially, the 
two moratoria have the same conditions and effects, but they apply to different 
types of loans. The debtors eligible for these moratoria were individuals whose 
pre-pandemic income was below a certain threshold and who subsequently 
became economically vulnerable as a consequence of the health crisis that 
began in March 2020.
Specifically, pursuant to Article  16 of RDL 11/2020, in order to be considered 
economically vulnerable, all of the following conditions must be met: i) debtors must 
be unemployed or, in the case of entrepreneurs, have lost at least 40% of their 
income; ii) household income, in the month previous to applying for the moratorium, 
must be no more than three times (with some exceptions) the IPREM (a Spanish 
public income indicator); iii) mortgage payments plus essential expenses and utility 
costs must exceed 35% of net household income; and iv) households’ economic 
circumstances must have changed significantly as a result of the health crisis, such 
that their mortgage payments have multiplied by at least 1.3 as a proportion of their 
household income.
Regarding the effects of these measures, during the duration of the legislative 
moratoria (a maximum of three months)2 the lending bank cannot demand any 
mortgage payments, nor any part thereof (repayment of capital or payment of 
interest), neither in full nor in part, and no interest is accrued. As a result of this 
temporary suspension of payment obligations, the loan maturity is extended by the 
duration of the moratorium.
Subsequently, in May 2020, in addition to the two legislative moratoria described 
above, a special regime was established for banking sector framework agreements, 
through the banking associations,3 on the deferral of loans of customers affected by 
the COVID-19 crisis. These framework agreements instigated by associations 








3	 RDL	 19/2020	 of	 26	 May	 2020	 adopting	 supplementary	 measures	 in	 the	 agricultural,	 scientific,	 economic,	
employment	and	social	security	and	taxation	sphere	to	alleviate	the	effects	of	COVID-19.
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institutions4 extended the scope of the moratoria from both a subjective and an 
objective standpoint.
From a subjective standpoint, because individuals applying for these moratoria do 
not need to meet the eligibility requirements established in Article 16 of RDL 11/2020 
for the legislative moratoria. Rather, any individual borrowers with loans that had not 
previously been in default and who have been economically affected by the COVID-19 
crisis – becoming unemployed or subject to furlough schemes (ERTEs by their 
Spanish acronym), or facing the suspension of or restrictions on their economic 
activity, or other equivalent circumstances – are eligible for these banking sector 
moratoria.
From an objective standpoint, because the new moratoria can last longer than the 
legislative ones. Specifically, the maximum duration is 12 months for the mortgage 
loan moratorium and six months for the personal loan moratorium.5 As regards their 
effects, unlike the legislative moratoria, the banking sector moratoria only suspend 
repayment of principal, while interest payments continue to fall due throughout.
Lastly, in early July, two further moratoria were introduced, in this case not only for 
individuals but also for legal entities. These moratoria apply to loans granted to the 
tourism sector6 and to the public transport of goods and charter bus sector.7
Most European countries have introduced moratorium schemes as an integral part 
of their support policies in response to the crisis. In this respect, the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) approved a series of conditions that loans had to satisfy in 
order for the moratoria to have a more flexible prudential treatment. These conditions 
included a deadline for application of the moratoria, which has been extended in 
successive Guidelines8 (first up to 30 September 2020 and subsequently up to 
31  March 2021) owing to the uncertainty surrounding economic activity and its 
potential recovery. 
For all five types of moratoria, lenders must report data to the Banco de España on 
the number of moratorium applications submitted by borrowers, the number of 
moratoria granted, the number of beneficiaries and whether they are wage-earners 
or self-employed, the outstanding amount of loans subject to moratoria and, for the 
4	 Spanish	 Banking	 Association	 (AEB)	 framework	 agreement	 (2020),	 Spanish	 Confederation	 of	 Savings	 Banks	
(CECA)	framework	agreement	(2020),	Spanish	Association	of	Credit	Cooperatives	(UNACC)	framework	agreement	
(2020)	and	Spanish	Association	of	Specialised	Lending	Institutions	(ASNEF)	framework	agreement	(2020).
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self-employed, the economic sector in which they operate.9 Drawing on this 
information provided by banks, since April 2020 the Banco de España has been 
publishing a monthly briefing note on the legislative and banking sector moratoria.10 
In addition, this ongoing monitoring of moratoria contributes to complying with 
Recommendation 2020/8 of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) of May 
202011 which, inter alia, recommends that EU national macroprudential authorities 
monitor the measures adopted and analyse their implications for financial stability.12
This article analyses the key factors that explain why households with a mortgage 
decide to take up a moratorium introduced in response to the impact of COVID-19, 
and the probability that they will choose a legislative moratorium. In addition, drawing 
on duration analysis, we estimate the probability of an original legislative moratorium 
expiring or being transferred to one of the other forms of moratoria.13
Clarifying the factors that explain the take-up of moratoria and the probability of 
their being legislative moratoria, as well as the exit therefrom and transfer to other 
types of moratoria, is key to understanding some of the implications that these 
measures will have in the coming months, once the period of more flexible prudential 
treatment established for them by the EBA comes to an end. It is important to note 
that legislative moratoria (which account for barely 5% of the outstanding credit 
stock subject to moratoria at end-2020) must be granted by law to applicants who 
satisfy the requirements established in the corresponding regulations (RDLs), but 
there is no obligation on banks to maintain the moratorium measures once the 
legally-established period ends. Accordingly, at that stage mortgage portfolio 
management decisions, among others, come into play.
The results of the econometric analysis show that the following groups record the 
highest take-up of moratoria: households that were more disadvantaged (for 
example, lower income households) or more vulnerable (households with higher 
debt or with mortgages with less favourable conditions) at the start of the pandemic; 
the self-employed; those hardest hit in terms of employment (in provinces with a 
higher unemployment rate or higher percentage of furloughed workers owing to 
COVID-19); and those linked to the economic sectors most affected (such as retail, 
hospitality or transport). This is consistent with the purpose of these schemes. 










13	 For	 alternative	 analyses	 of	 the	 trajectory	 and	 different	 characteristics	 of	 the	 loans	 and	borrowers	 subject	 to	
moratoria,	see	Banco	de	España	(2020)	and	Alves	et	al.	(2020	and	2021).
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terms of lower capital ratios or higher NPL rates). All the above highlights the 
important role that the moratoria have played to cushion the initial impact of the 
pandemic, but also the need to monitor these schemes, on account of the high risk 
of borrowers falling into default if economic activity fails to normalise in the near 
term.
In this respect, the results also seem to suggest that households with a higher debt-
to-income ratio, those located in regions heavily affected by the pandemic and lower 
income households tend to be subject to legislative moratoria for longer (or are more 
likely to take up non-legislative moratoria when the former expire). This is consistent 
with the possibility of a latent risk in banking sector moratoria portfolios for a certain 
household segment. The findings also show that loans that are classified as Stage 2 
(i.e. with a significant increase in credit risk) or non-performing when the moratoria 
expire are especially those that were initially subject to legislative moratoria and 
those pertaining to households with lower income, higher debt ratios or poorer credit 
histories, older households or those that had a personal guarantee, and those 
located in regions where COVID-19 has had a more severe impact on employment. 
In this respect, it is important to note that although the take-up of legislative moratoria 
by the self-employed has been proportionally higher, reflecting the severe impact of 
the crisis on this group, the findings do not suggest that when their mortgage loans 
exit moratoria they are more likely to be classified as Stage 2 or non-performing.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The next section analyses 
how the total volume of applications made and moratoria granted has evolved and 
the status of the existing moratoria. Section 3 describes the characteristics of the 
granular data used for the econometric analysis of the moratoria, followed in 
Section 4 by a definition of the empirical strategy used. Section 5 describes the 
distribution and main characteristics of the variables considered and Section 6 
comments on the results obtained. The last section presents a summary of the 
main conclusions.
2	  Trajectory and current status of moratorium applications, moratoria granted 
and outstanding moratoria 
Drawing on the information provided by banks to the Banco de España, the number 
of applications rose swiftly from the outset. The number of moratoria granted also 
rose rapidly, such that acceptance rates have been high from the start. For instance, 
at end-May 2020 acceptance rates were already over 80% for legislative mortgage 
and non-mortgage moratoria and over 75% for banking sector moratoria (see 
Chart 1.1). Moreover, this high level of acceptance was widespread across banks. 
With data at end-December, more than 260,000 applications had been made for 
legislative mortgage moratoria, of which 222,000 had been granted, an acceptance 
rate of 85%. In the case of legislative non-mortgage moratoria, the applications 
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numbered more than 410,000, of which more than 363,000 had been granted, an 
acceptance rate over 88%. Given their less strict requirements, at end-December 
the acceptance rate for banking sector moratoria was even higher, at 97.4%, with 
more than 794,000 applications having been granted of the more than 815,000 
submitted.
The outstanding amount of the loans subject to legislative mortgage moratoria was 
almost €20  billion (4.3% of the total outstanding amount of mortgage credit to 
individuals) (see Chart 1.2), much higher than the total for legislative non-mortgage 
moratoria (almost €2.7 billion, 1.5% of the total outstanding amount of non-mortgage 
credit to individuals). In turn, the outstanding amount of the loans subject to banking 
sector moratoria was over €31  billion (4.8% of the total outstanding amount of 
mortgage and non-mortgage credit to individuals).
For the last two types of moratoria, relating to the tourism and transport sectors, the 
number of applications and moratoria granted is much lower. Specifically, at end-
NUMBER AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNT OF LEGISLATIVE AND BANKING SECTOR LOAN MORATORIA
Chart 1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a For each moratorium scheme, the bars denote the cumulative total of applications (left-hand axis) and the diamond the percentage of that total that 
was approved (right-hand axis).
b The number of applications for legislative and non-legislative mortgage moratoria, and the number granted, fell from October. According to the 
explanations provided in the information reported by banks, this was due to: reclassification of some of these moratoria to banking sector moratoria, 
given that the customer failed to evidence vulnerability; elimination of applications in which, ultimately, the customer failed to present the necessary 
documentation; updating of claims; or adjustment of the information reported after verifying operations that had been rejected or cancelled by the 
customer. All these reasons, except for the first, also explain the decrease in the number of applications for banking sector moratoria, and in the number 
granted, between November and December.
c For each moratorium scheme, the bars denote the take-up volume (left-hand axis) and the diamond denotes this volume as a percentage of the 
total eligible loan book (for example, the legislative mortgage moratoria as a percentage of total mortgage credit to individuals) (right-hand axis).
d From October, the outstanding amount of legislative mortgage and non-mortgage moratoria declined. According to the explanations provided in the 
information reported by banks, this was due to: reclassification of some of these moratoria to banking sector moratoria, given that the customer 
failed to evidence vulnerability; elimination of applications in which, ultimately, the customer failed to present the necessary documentation; updating 
of claims; or adjustment of the information reported after verifying operations that had been rejected or cancelled by the customer. All these reasons, 
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2020, 1,570 applications had been submitted for the tourism sector legislative 
moratorium, of which 1,362 had been granted, an acceptance rate of almost 87% 
(see Chart  2.1). In the case of the transport sector legislative moratorium, 1,836 
applications had been submitted, of which 1,661 had been granted, an acceptance 
rate of over 90%. The outstanding amount of the loans subject to the tourism sector 
moratorium was over €2 billion (4.1% of the total outstanding amount of the eligible 
loan book), while in the case of the transport sector moratorium it was just €125 million 
(see Chart 2.2).
For the three types of moratoria for individuals (the two legislative and the banking 
sector moratoria), the vast majority of the borrowers benefiting from these measures 
are wage-earners, who account for more than 75% of the total. However, considering 
that the Spanish labour market has a much higher number of wage-earners,14 in 
proportional terms the take-up of the self-employed is higher; this highlights the 
severe impact the crisis has had on this group. The breakdown by economic sector 
of the self-employed who have taken up moratoria shows that retail, hospitality and 
other services together account for 56% of the total moratoria, followed at a 
considerable distance by professional, scientific and technical activities, 
transportation, construction, and manufacturing. Overall, these seven economic 
sectors account for almost 80% of the total moratoria granted to the self-employed.
14	 According	to	National	Statistics	Institute	(INE)	data,	at	1	January	2020	there	were	1.9 million	self-employed	in	
Spain,	compared	with	almost	20	million	wage-earners.
NUMBER AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNT OF TOURISM AND TRANSPORT SECTOR LOAN MORATORIA
Chart 2
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a For each moratorium scheme, the bars denote the cumulative total of applications (left-hand axis) and the diamond the percentage of that total that 
was approved (right-hand axis).
b For each moratorium scheme, the bars denote the take-up volume (left-hand axis) and the diamond denotes the tourism sector moratoria as a 
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To sum up, the various loan moratorium schemes adopted in response to the health 
crisis have attracted a high number of applications: almost 1.5 million at end-
December 2020, of which 1.38 million had been granted, a very high acceptance rate 
verging on 93%. As a result of this high number of applications received and 
moratoria granted, at end-December 2020 the volume of loans subject to moratoria 
was over €56 billion (8% of all outstanding credit in the eligible loan books). This 
notably enhances the beneficiaries’ ability to meet their financial obligations and 
their available liquidity in the near term, in accordance with the goals of these 
schemes.
However, the data provided by banks under the provisions of the RDLs15 have their 
limitations. The main constraint is that they refer exclusively to the cumulative stock 
of applications for moratoria and moratoria granted since the schemes were first 
launched, irrespective of whether or not the moratoria are still in place. In 
consequence, to ascertain the current status of the moratoria, it is essential to 
identify the repayment flows – of moratoria that have expired or have been cancelled 
– so as to determine the volume of existing moratoria at each point in time. To obtain 
this information, the data contained in the Banco de España’s Central Credit Register 
(CCR) are used. These data provide the latest available information (for this article, 
up to December 2020) on the performance of each loan subject to any kind of 
moratorium since origination. The CCR data include, in addition to the types of 
moratoria referred to above, all other moratoria – bilateral moratoria – granted as a 
consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic, backed by the principle of freedom of 
contract envisaged in the Spanish Civil Code and which may be agreed between 
parties even though they are not covered by a sector-wide framework agreement. 
Accordingly, based on the CCR data, we now draw a distinction between two large 
groups of moratoria: legislative moratoria, which include the mortgage and non-
mortgage moratoria for individuals and the tourism and transport sector moratoria; 
and conventional moratoria, which include the banking sector and bilateral moratoria.
Chart  3.1 depicts the flows of expiries of loan moratoria as a consequence of 
discharges, repayments and cancellations (three ways by which moratoria come to 
an end and which are referred to hereafter as “reductions in moratoria”). The pattern 
of reductions is very different for the two groups, as a result of their different duration. 
For legislative moratoria, consistent with the higher volumes granted in April and 
May, the biggest reductions are in July and August, i.e. three months later, since as 
indicated earlier this was the duration of the legislative mortgage and non-mortgage 
moratoria up to the publication of RDL 3/2021 (see footnote 2). Specifically, 60% of 
the reductions in legislative moratoria occurred in July and August, and 77% had 
occurred up to August.
15	 See	footnote	9.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 19 FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW, ISSUE 40 SPRING 2021
By contrast, the reductions in conventional moratoria, which have a longer duration, 
came later (see Chart 3.1), with half of these reductions occurring in October and 
November. On the latest data available, the cumulative total of reductions is very 
similar in the two groups of moratoria, amounting to some €11 billion in each group.
The different exit pattern for the two groups gives rise to a sustained increase in the 
cumulative total (see Chart 3.2) from June (up to May, only 9% of the total reductions 
had occurred), owing to legislative moratoria in the early months and conventional 
moratoria in the later months.
To recap, the cumulative amount subject to moratoria (some €28  billion in each 
group) and the cumulative amount expired (around €11 billion in each group) are 
similar for both groups, such that it could be concluded that the outstanding amounts 
subject to moratoria in the two groups are also similar (at around €17 billion). Yet 
nothing could be further from the truth, since there is another element to be 
considered, i.e. transfers between groups of moratoria. Specifically, over the course 
of 2020, loans initially subject to legislative moratoria amounting to €15.2 billion were 
transferred to conventional moratoria. This is because, as indicated earlier, the 
shorter duration of the legislative moratoria is conducive to their being transferred, 
upon expiry, to banking sector or bilateral moratoria. Accordingly, at end-December, 
the difference between legislative and conventional moratoria is much greater in 
terms of the outstanding amount than in terms of the cumulative total of applications 
LOAN MORATORIA EXPIRED OR CANCELLED
Chart 3
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The reductions data run to November, consistent with the criterion used to calculate the moratoria outstanding at December (moratoria that expire in 
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and moratoria granted: the loans outstanding subject to moratoria stood at around 
€34 billion, the bulk of which are conventional moratoria (over €32 billion, 95% of the 
total), while legislative moratoria accounted for just €2  billion (5% of the total 
outstanding). 
As regards the classification of the loans amounting to almost €22 billion whose 
moratoria have expired or have been cancelled, most (almost three-quarters of the 
total) are performing, that is, their risk has not increased since origination. Almost 
20% are classified as Stage 2, i.e. their risk has increased and their credit quality has 
declined since initial recognition, but no credit losses have been recorded. Lastly, 
just 6% are non-performing, that is, they have become impaired and credit losses 
have appeared. By type of collateral, 21% of loans secured by mortgage that were 
subject to moratoria are classified as Stage 2 (15% of unsecured loans or loans not 
secured by mortgage) and 9% are classified as non-performing (6% for all loans 
not secured by mortgage) (see Chart 4.1).
Lastly, regarding the outstanding moratoria, which amount to more than €34 billion, 
Chart 4.2 depicts the expected expiries in the coming months (from January 2021). 
Given that conventional moratoria account for the bulk (95%) of the total volume of 
outstanding moratoria at December 2020, they fully shape the expiry pattern. 
Chart 4.2 also shows that some 85% of the total will expire in the first six months of 
2021, and that the main expiries (more than 50%) are concentrated between April 
and May.
CREDIT QUALITY OF LOANS EXITING EXPIRED MORATORIA AND EXPIRIES OF OUTSTANDING MORATORIA
Chart 4
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Non-performing loans include loans that are non-performing for subjective reasons and loans that are non-performing for objective reasons 
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In any event, the trajectory of the loan moratoria over the coming months (specifically, 
the total volume of loans subject to moratoria and the possible new moratoria 
granted) may change, given the current uncertainty surrounding the course of 
economic activity, the fact that the EBA is reactivating its Guidelines on the deadline 
for application of moratoria16 and the entry into force of RDL 3/2021. In consequence, 
the expiry profile shown to date could alter. The experience of these months shows 
that support measures of this kind are flexible and that they may be activated and 
withdrawn relatively quickly. It also shows that they must be used prudently, so as to 
ensure that at the same time as they ease borrowers’ potential liquidity problems 
they also preserve adequate repayment incentives.
3	 Databases
In order to describe as fully as possible the quality of the mortgage loans subject to 
some sort of deferral measure, whether through the legislative or banking sector 
moratorium schemes linked to the COVID-19 health crisis or through individual 
bilateral moratoria, two administrative registers are used: the Banco de España’s 
CCR, which has granular data on the characteristics of all credit transactions in 
Spain and on some borrower characteristics, and the data obtained from banks’ 
own balance sheets, included in their regular reporting to the Banco de España.
The CCR is a confidential database belonging to the Banco de España that has data 
on all bank loans extended since 1984 in Spain over €6,000. The data are reported 
monthly and include loan characteristics (interest rate, maturity, loan amount, 
collateral, etc.) and also some borrower characteristics (gender, age, economic 
sector, employment status, postcode, etc.). Drawing on all this information it is 
possible to analyse bank lending on a monthly basis and the key characteristics of 
the loans granted.
The analysis in this article considers only households’ mortgage loans in force as at 
31  December 2019. The main characteristics of these loans will be described, 
drawing on certain variables taken from the loan register, such as original term to 
maturity (in months), interest rate, number of borrowers, and whether or not there is 
a personal guarantee. In addition, any changes in the payment commitment status 
that may arise throughout the period considered are also taken into account. For this 
purpose, using data recently incorporated into the loan register, which enhance 
banks’ reporting on their exposure to loans affected by the support measures 
approved to address the social and economic impact of the pandemic, it is possible 
to identify mortgages that are benefiting from a payment moratorium and to ascertain 
16	 See	EBA	 (2020b)	 in	which	 the	EBA	 reactivated	 the	application	of	 its	Guidelines	up	 to	31 March	2021,	 thus	
extending	for	borrowers	that	had	not	previously	benefited	from	payment	moratoria	on	bank	debt	the	opportunity	
to	do	so.
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whether their grace period is linked to the COVID-19 crisis (in other words, whether 
it is a legislative, banking sector or bilateral moratorium).
Certain borrower characteristics are also identified, to determine the loan’s credit 
risk, using for this purpose data available in the CCR since 2016. Specifically, 
characteristics of the household reference person (assumed to be the oldest 
borrower) are considered, as a synthesis of the characteristics of the mortgagor 
household: their age in 2019, if they are foreign or self-employed and also their past 
credit history (if they have had loans classified as non-performing before 2019). In 
addition, other less granular data are used to proxy certain household characteristics 
that are not available in the CCR and that are highly relevant to measure households’ 
ability to pay, such as income and the employment situation in their region. Average 
gross household income in 2016 in the postcode in which the mortgaged property is 
located is used to proxy gross household income and the household debt-to-income 
ratio. Other variables used are the percentage of furloughed workers and the 
unemployment rate in the province in which the property is located, to quantify the 
probability that the household may have undergone a negative income shock 
affecting its ability to meet its payment obligations.
In addition, to include aspects that may influence banks’ decisions, information 
included in their regular supervisory financial reporting to the Banco de España is 
used. Specifically, their asset volume, a measure of capital close to the leverage 
ratio (net equity to assets, which we call the “capital ratio”), their profitability (rate of 
return on average total assets (ROA)), their liquidity ratio (liquid assets to total assets), 
their NPL ratio (non-performing assets to loans to other resident actors) and a 
measure of their mortgage lending over the last five years.
By combining these data sources, a relatively complete description is obtained of the 
characteristics of each loan at the mortgage/bank level. This allows us to analyse which 
supply-side factors (linked to the bank) and demand-side factors (linked to the borrower 
or the macroeconomic situation of the province in which the property is located) could 
be most useful to explain the probability: i) that a household will have taken up any of 
the various types of COVID-19 moratoria; ii) that it will have transferred from one type of 
payment moratorium to another; and iii) that it will have exited the moratorium.
4 Empirical identification
The main aim of this study is to investigate the specific characteristics of mortgages 
that have been subject to any of the different types of payment moratoria introduced 
in response to the impact of COVID-19, be they legislative, banking sector or bilateral 
moratoria. It also aims to characterise the households that took up legislative 
moratoria and the performance of the moratoria over time, highlighting any transfers 
between moratoria that may have taken place.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 23 FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW, ISSUE 40 SPRING 2021
As discussed in the previous section, CCR data on mortgages that were in force as 
at December 2019 are used; this provides us with more than 5.3 million observations. 
The CCR database includes a large number of variables as to households, mortgages, 
regions of Spain and mortgagee banks, but the drawback is that some of the data 
on households are static. We assigned them to each household, drawing on the 
information available at the postcode level (for instance, for average household 
income), or on the macroeconomic data available at the province level to proxy 
information that is not available in the CCR at a more granular level. Nevertheless, 
taking into account all these factors enables us to gain a better understanding of 
how these support measures have functioned, which households have been most 
affected by them and which banks are making most use of them and are consequently 
most exposed to how they evolve going forward. This can provide us with indications 
as to the future risk for the banking system when these measures come to an end.
First, access to the moratorium schemes and the characteristics of the mortgages 
subject to the schemes are analysed. The dependent variable is a dichotomous 
variable that takes the value 1 if the mortgage is, or has been, subject to any of the 
three types of moratoria (legislative, banking sector or bilateral moratoria) during 
2020 (up to 31  December), and the value 0 otherwise. Thus, this variable is 
Moratoriumij, where subscript “i” is the loan and subscript “j” is the lending bank. 
This would be an estimated ordinary least squares linear probability model, thus:17
[1]
where four sets of variables are introduced as explanatory factors: 1)  household 
characteristics (synthesised through the information on the household reference 
person, deemed to be the oldest household member who is a mortgagor), including 
average household income (drawing on National Statistics Institute (INE) postcode 
data for 2016), the age of the household reference person, their credit history, their 
total bank debt-to-income ratio in 2019 and, for the self-employed, their profession 
or economic sector;18 2) loan characteristics, including the interest rate level, whether 
it is fixed or variable, whether the loan has a personal guarantee, and the logarithm 
of its original maturity; 3)  characteristics of the situation at the provincial level, 
reflecting the impact of the pandemic on employment through the percentage of 
furloughed workers and the unemployment rate (both obtained from the National 
Public Employment Service (SPEE)); and 4) bank characteristics, including bank size 
(logarithm of total assets), capital ratio (net equity to assets), liquidity ratio (liquid 
17	 A	linear	probability	model,	rather	than	a	binary	probit	type	model,	has	been	used	for	several	reasons:	first,	to	
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assets to total assets), profitability (ROA) and NPL ratio (non-performing assets to 
credit to other resident sectors), as an indicator of whether a bank’s mortgage 
business has grown more than the system average over the last five years. In addition, 
uij represents the error component, and in the estimation standard errors are 
simultaneously corrected for bank and property postcode clusters.
The possible heterogeneity of the results is also analysed, estimating the same 
model as that contained in equation  [1], adding interactions between certain 
variables. Thus, for example, we match the debt-to-income ratio to household 
income, to check whether the effect of the debt diminishes as income diminishes, 
and we analyse which banks are more likely to have mortgages subject to moratorium 
schemes according to the mortgage risk profile, captured by the interest rate, original 
maturity or the bank debt-to-income ratio.
Lastly, we also investigate whether legislative moratoria differ in any way from the 
other types of moratoria, whether they are greater risk or have a greater presence at 
certain types of banks. In addition, focusing on legislative moratoria, we analyse 
which of their characteristics are conducive to their expiring or being transferred to 
a different type of moratoria. This enables us to identify the characteristics of 
mortgages that are transferred from legislative to non-legislative moratoria and to 
detect the risk building up owing to the new grace periods.
To ascertain the key factors that determine the probability of a mortgage loan subject 
to moratorium being initially subject to a legislative moratorium, a linear regression 
model is estimated where the dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the 
value 1 if the original moratorium in 2020 was a legislative moratorium, with the 
following equation:
[2]
where the sample is limited to mortgages subject to any of the types of moratoria. In 
this case also, standard errors are simultaneously corrected for bank and property 
postcode clusters.
To analyse the transitions of a legislative moratorium at expiry or at change in status, 
a duration model is considered in which the moratorium is monitored from the point 
of origination to the last observation, be it upon expiry or change of status or simply 
because it remains outstanding. This type of model allows us to analyse the length 
of time the loans remain in a certain status and, at the same time, to control for the 
fact that moratoria are observed that have not yet either expired or changed status 
(censored observations), because there are no more observations available on them. 
1 i
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For the purposes of this analysis, two types of exit from or transition between 
moratoria are studied: expiry of outstanding legislative moratoria, either ahead of 
term or when the moratorium ends; and change in status of outstanding legislative 
moratoria, becoming banking sector or bilateral moratoria. In both cases a Cox 
proportional risk model19 is used, where the exit rate takes the following form:
[3]
 
where the rate of exit is the probability in each period “t” (month) of the moratorium 
ending with a transition (expiry or change of status). In this case, standard errors are 
corrected only for bank cluster, as it is not possible to simultaneously correct for 
postcode cluster.
Lastly, we also analyse the factors that explain why a loan whose moratorium has 
expired is classified as non-performing or Stage 2 as at December 2020. For this 
purpose, we use a similar model as in equation [2], but we replace the dependent 
variable with a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the loan whose moratorium 
has expired is classified as non-performing or Stage 2 at end-2020, and a value 0 




As indicated earlier, this article draws on information on mortgage loans granted to 
households in Spain in force as at 31 December 2019. Table 1 depicts the average, 
the standard deviation, the first quartile, the median and the third quartile of the 
variables used in the analysis. The set of mortgages considered is classified 
according to whether they were subject to payment moratoria in 2020. The loans 
that were are then classified into two groups, according to whether they were 
originally legislative moratoria and to the possible changes in their payment deferral 
status over the year.
Table 1 shows that around 5% of residential mortgages granted to households in 
force as at 31 December 2019 benefited from a payment moratorium in 2020; of 
these, around three-fifths were initially legislative moratoria. In other words, at least 
19	 A	Cox	model,	entailing	a	risk	function	h(t)	with	parameter	θ	constant	and	equal	to	1,	was	used	for	the	sake	of	
simplicity.
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55.9% of the households that obtained a mortgage payment moratorium in 2020 
were vulnerable households in accordance with the definition established in RDL 
8/2020 and RDL 11/2020.20 In addition, of the total mortgage moratoria that were 
originally legislative moratoria, 47.8% concluded before the end of 2020 and 51.8% 
were transferred to another type of moratorium (mainly banking sector) between 
March and December 2020. Lastly, of the moratoria that expired, 23% of the 
20 This entails, as discussed in the introduction, that households’ mortgage payments plus utility costs and essential 
expenses	(electricity,	gas,	water,	telecommunication	services	and	service	charge)	account	for	more	than	35%	of	




SOURCE: Devised by authors, drawing on CCR data.
NOTE: The table depicts the average, the standard deviation (SD) and the first, second and third quartiles of the distribution of some characteristics 
of the mortgages in force as at December 2019.
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corresponding loans were classified as non-performing or Stage 2 as at December 
2020.
Regarding the characteristics of the households considered, the logarithm of 
gross income per household (in euro) averages 9.74, with a standard deviation of 
0.44 (in other words, average gross income per household is approximately 
€11,855). The household reference person (the oldest mortgagor) has an average 
age of 58 (the logarithm of the age of the household reference person in months 
averages 6.37), is foreign in 5% of households, self-employed in 11% and has a 
poor credit history in 8.1%.
The mortgage characteristics show that the average mortgage rate is 1.6%, although 
it varies enormously, with a dispersion coefficient of 87.8%. Of the mortgages 
considered, 15% have a personal guarantee and the logarithm of the number of 
months to maturity at origination is 5.73 (i.e. average original maturity of slightly 
more than 25 years).
In the provinces where the housing subject to the mortgages considered is located 
the unemployment rate is 14.5% (slightly below the nationwide rate, which was 
16.2% in December 2020). The percentage of furloughed workers is 18.2% (also 
below the nationwide level, which was around 24% in January 2021).
As regards the average characteristics of the mortgagee banks, in the period 
previous to that considered in the analysis (i.e. in 2020 Q1), the logarithm of their 
total assets averaged 18.7 (over €128,153 million), their average leverage ratio was 
8.15% and their average NPL ratio was 5%. Their ROA stood at 0.48% and in 0.47% 
of cases the banks’ mortgage business had grown more than the system average 
over the last five years.
6	 Results
This section first analyses the extent to which borrower and bank characteristics can 
determine the probability of a mortgage payment moratorium being obtained during 
the period considered. It also includes an in-depth analysis of possible heterogeneous 
effects by borrower income levels and banks’ balance sheet strength. This is followed 
by an analysis of the impact of these borrower and bank characteristics on the 
probability of a mortgage loan being initially subject to a legislative moratorium in 
2020, of those initially legislative mortgage moratoria concluding before 31 December 
2020, and of their status changing (transfer to banking sector or bilateral moratoria 
or cancellation) in 2020. 
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6.1 Probability of being subject to a mortgage payment moratorium
Table 2 presents the results of the specification in equation [1], an estimated ordinary 
least squares linear probability model, to determine the extent to which the borrower, 
bank and mortgage characteristics, and also the macroeconomic situation of the 
province in which the mortgaged housing is located, may be relevant to determine 
the probability of a mortgage payment moratorium being obtained in the period 
March to December 2020.
The results of the estimation are set out in three columns: column  (1) shows the 
controls specified for each of the aspects considered; column (2) includes additional 
information on the activity status of the household reference person; and column (3) 
includes information on the economic sector with which the household reference 
person identifies, in accordance with the CCR data available. To avoid differences in 
the coefficients reported owing to changes in the sample size, the analysis is limited 
to 5,308,499 mortgages for which all the necessary data are available to estimate 
the specification with more controls.
In accordance with the results shown in Table 2, both the borrower and the mortgage 
characteristics, and also the macroeconomic situation in the region where the 
housing is located, are relevant to explain the probability of a mortgage moratorium 
being in place in 2020, and their effects are stable in the different specifications 
considered.
Thus, the higher the household income, the lower the probability of a mortgage in 
force at end-2019 becoming subject to a payment moratorium in 2020. Specifically, 
the probability of a household in the third income distribution quartile having a 
moratorium is 19.2% lower than that for a similar household in the first quartile. 
Conversely, households whose reference person is older have a higher probability of 
having a mortgage payment moratorium. Specifically, the average probability of 
having a mortgage moratorium is 8.8% higher for households whose reference 
person is in the third age-group quartile (around 56 years of age) than for those 
whose reference person is in the first age-group quartile (around 48 years of age). 
Likewise, if the household reference person is foreign, the probability of having a 
mortgage moratorium is three percentage points (3 pp) higher, i.e. the probability is 
60.3% higher. If the household reference person is self-employed, the probability of 
having a mortgage payment moratorium is 4 pp higher, almost double the average. 
The impact is similar if the household reference person has a poor credit history (an 
increase of 107% in the average probability).
Considering the employment status of wage-earners or the economic sector of the 
self-employed, columns (2) and (3) of Table 2 analyse their impact on the likelihood 
of having a moratorium in greater detail. As column (2) shows, the probability of 
having a mortgage moratorium is lower for public employees, employees of the 
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Household, mortgage, regional and lending bank characteristics are all relevant to explain the probability of having a mortgage moratorium 
as a consequence of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Take-up of the moratoria is highest among households that were more 
disadvantaged or more vulnerable at the start of the pandemic, the self-employed, those employed in the economic sectors most affected 
by the pandemic, households with higher debt-to-income ratios and those with mortgages in provinces hardest hit in terms of employment.
Higher interest rates, longer repayment periods and a higher debt-to-income ratio also increase the probability, as does having a mortgage 
granted by a larger bank, with a higher NPL ratio or whose lending business has grown more than the system average over the last five years.
DETERMINANTS OF TAKE-UP OF COVID-19 MORATORIA
Table 2
SOURCE: Banco de España.
NOTE: The table presents the results of a linear probability regression that explains the determinants of mortgagors at end-2019 having applied for 
and been granted a moratorium in 2020 as a consequence of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The first row depicts the coefficients and the 
second row the robust standard deviations (corrected for mortgaged property postcode and lending bank clusters), followed by the corresponding 
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banking group extending the loan and pensioners (60%, 28% and 98% lower, 
respectively), while for wage-earners it is 16% higher than the average probability. 
Similarly, for employees in retail, transport and hospitality (the economic sectors 
most affected by the pandemic and for which, in the case of transport and tourism, 
there are also sector-specific moratoria in place), the average probability is higher 
(10%, 42% and 207% higher, respectively), while for employees in all the other 
sectors considered it is lower.
The mortgage characteristics are also relevant to explain the probability of having a 
mortgage payment moratorium. Higher interest rates, longer repayment periods and 
Household, mortgage, regional and lending bank characteristics are all relevant to explain the probability of having a mortgage moratorium 
as a consequence of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Take-up of the moratoria is highest among households that were more 
disadvantaged or more vulnerable at the start of the pandemic, the self-employed, those employed in the economic sectors most affected 
by the pandemic, households with higher debt-to-income ratios and those with mortgages in provinces hardest hit in terms of employment.
Higher interest rates, longer repayment periods and a higher debt-to-income ratio also increase the probability, as does having a mortgage 
granted by a larger bank, with a higher NPL ratio or whose lending business has grown more than the system average over the last five years.
DETERMINANTS OF TAKE-UP OF COVID-19 MORATORIA (cont'd)
Table 2
SOURCE: Banco de España.
NOTE: The table presents the results of a linear probability regression that explains the determinants of mortgagors at end-2019 having applied for 
and been granted a moratorium in 2020 as a consequence of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The first row depicts the coefficients and the 
second row the robust standard deviations (corrected for mortgaged property postcode and lending bank clusters), followed by the corresponding 
significance levels: *** significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%.
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(0.005)
    All other employees 0.008***
(0.002)
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(0.005)
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(0.002)
    Energy and water -0.036***
(0.006)
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(0.002)
    Wholesale and retail trade 0.005*
(0.003)
    Transportation 0.021***
(0.006)
    Hospitality 0.103***
(0.011)
    Public sector -0.047***
(0.012)
    Financial sector -0.036***
(0.004)
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a higher debt-to-income ratio and, albeit to a lesser extent, having needed a 
guarantor, raise the probability of having a mortgage payment moratorium. 
Specifically, an increase in the mortgage interest rate from the first interest rate 
distribution quartile to the third (an increase of 1.6 pp) lifts the average probability of 
having a payment moratorium by 16.8%, while an extension of the repayment period 
from the first to the third quartile (a difference of some 11 years between the two 
quartiles) raises the average probability by 24%. Having needed a personal guarantee 
increases the average probability of having a mortgage payment moratorium by 1 pp 
(an increase of 2% in the average probability), and an increase in the debt-to-income 
ratio from the first to the third quartile lifts the average probability by 22%.
The macroeconomic situation in the province is also relevant to explain the probability 
of having a mortgage payment moratorium in 2020. Specifically, every percentage 
point of increase in the unemployment rate or in the percentage of furloughed 
workers in the province lifts the average probability of having a mortgage payment 
moratorium by 0.2 pp. In this case, given that cross-province dispersion is higher in 
the unemployment rate (difference of 7.7 pp between the third and the first quartile) 
than in the percentage of furloughed workers (difference of 5.2 pp between the third 
and the first quartile), from a province in the third quartile to one in the first quartile 
the increase in average probability is higher (31% compared with 21%) in both 
distributions.
As regards bank characteristics, the results presented in Table 2 suggest that having 
a mortgage granted by a larger bank (higher asset volume),21 with a higher NPL ratio 
or whose lending business has grown more than the system average over the last 
five years raises the probability of the mortgage being subject to a payment 
moratorium on a stable basis in all the specifications considered. Specifically, an 
increase in the NPL ratio from the third to the first quartile lifts the probability by 
10%, while the fact that the banks’ lending business has grown more than the system 
average over the last five years raises the average probability by 1.5  pp (around 
30%).
All these results provide robust evidence that the support measure in the form of 
legislative or banking sector moratoria is coherent. It has tended to have most impact 
on households that were more disadvantaged or more vulnerable before the 











BANCO DE ESPAÑA 32 FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW, ISSUE 40 SPRING 2021
households in regions where COVID-19 has had more impact on employment or in 
economic sectors that have felt the brunt of the pandemic. This is coherent with the 
purpose for which these schemes were created.
Table 3 analyses the heterogeneity of the results obtained, adding interactions to 
analyse how certain variables are interlinked. For example, how households’ debt-
to-income ratios may vary for different income levels, or in accordance with banks’ 
balance sheet strength (banks’ leverage and NPL ratios). Column  (1) of Table  3 
To analyse the heterogeneous effects in the results, interactions among some of the characteristics that explain the probability of having a 
mortgage moratorium as a consequence of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic are included. The analysis shows that from the first to the 
third income quartile, the effect of the debt-to-income ratio is halved. Likewise, bank weakness, captured both by a lower leverage ratio and 
a higher NPL ratio, accentuates the impact of other characteristics that proxy mortgage risk, such as a longer repayment period or a higher
interest rate.
DETERMINANTS OF INITIALLY LEGISLATIVE MORATORIA AND TRANSFERS. HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS
Table 3
SOURCE: Banco de España.
NOTE: The table presents the results of a linear probability regression that explains the determinants of mortgagors at end-2019 having applied for 
and been granted a moratorium in 2020 as a result of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The first row depicts the coefficients and the second 
row the robust standard deviations (corrected for mortgaged property postcode and lending bank clusters), followed by the corresponding significance 
levels: *** significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%.
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***030.0***030.0***620.0ngieroF    
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includes the interplay between households’ debt-to-income ratios and the logarithm 
of household income. Column (2) includes the interplay between households’ debt-
to-income ratios and banks’ capital and NPL ratios. Lastly, column (3) incorporates 
into the column  (2) specification interactions between mortgage characteristics, 
such as original maturity or interest rate, and banks’ capital and NPL ratios.
To analyse the heterogeneous effects in the results, interactions among some of the characteristics that explain the probability of having a 
mortgage moratorium as a consequence of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic are included. The analysis shows that from the first to the 
third income quartile, the effect of the debt-to-income ratio is halved. Likewise, bank weakness, captured both by a lower leverage ratio and 
a higher NPL ratio, accentuates the impact of other characteristics that proxy mortgage risk, such as a longer repayment period or a higher
interest rate.
DETERMINANTS OF INITIALLY LEGISLATIVE MORATORIA AND TRANSFERS. HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS (cont'd)
Table 3
SOURCE: Banco de España.
NOTE: The table presents the results of a linear probability regression that explains the determinants of mortgagors at end-2019 having applied for 
and been granted a moratorium in 2020 as a result of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The first row depicts the coefficients and the second 
row the robust standard deviations (corrected for mortgaged property postcode and lending bank clusters), followed by the corresponding significance 
levels: *** significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%.
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable
***800.0***800.0***900.0)knab stessA(goL    
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
100.0000.0000.0knab/oitar latipaC    
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
020.0410.0710.0knab AOR    
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
200.0**300.0*300.0knab/oitar LPN    
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
110.0**410.0**810.0htworg gnidnel egagtrom hgiH    
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
***210.0-)emocni dlohesuoH(goL × )oitar emocni-ot-tbeD(goL    
(0.003)
100.0000.0knab/oitar latipaC × ))9102( oitar emocni-ot-tbeD(goL    
(0.001) (0.000)
***200.0***300.0knab/oitar LPN × ))9102( oitar emocni-ot-tbeD(goL    
(0.001) (0.001)
*200.0-knab/oitar latipaC × ))shtnom( ytirutam lanigirO(goL    
(0.001)
    Log(Original maturity (months)) × NPL ratio/bank 0.008***
(0.001)
    Interest rate × Capital ratio/bank -0.002**
(0.001)
    Interest rate × NPL ratio/bank 0.001**
(0.001)
803.5803.5803.5)noillim( snoitavresbo fo rebmuN
R2 0.039 0.035 0.036
Mortgage subject to moratorium
Heterogeneous effects
Bank characteristics
Coefficients expressed in per-unit values
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As Table 3 shows, in the case of household income, from the first to the third 
percentile of the distribution the positive impact of the debt-to-income ratio is halved 
(for an increase in the latter from the first to the third quartile), down from an increase 
of 22% to one of just 11%. In turn, an increase of 1.7 pp in the default rate (which 
corresponds to an increase from the first to the third percentile of the distribution) 
doubles the impact of the debt-to-income ratio, lifting the average probability by 
42%. In addition, bank weakness, captured both by a lower leverage ratio and a 
higher NPL ratio, also accentuates the impact of other characteristics that proxy 
mortgage risk, such as a longer repayment period or a higher interest rate. Thus, for 
example, extending the repayment period or raising the interest rate (in an amount 
similar to moving from the first to the third quartile), for a similar change in the NPL 
ratio, would increase the average probability by 35% or 61%, compared with the 
24% or 31% commented in Table 1. The effect of bank solvency is also significant: 
banks with a lower capital ratio are more likely to have moratoria with a higher risk 
profile, although the impact is less relevant from an economic standpoint than that 
of the NPL ratio (an exercise similar to that described above would raise the probability 
by 29% and 37%, respectively). These results appear to suggest, either that the 
weakest banks tend to have a higher proportion of low-quality borrowers, and thus 
a higher percentage of moratoria for this market segment, or that they are the ones 
that have made most use of this tool for this type of households, in an endeavour to 
counter the negative impact of the pandemic on their provisioning and, ultimately, on 
their solvency.
6.2 Transfers
Table 3 focuses on initially legislative moratoria. Specifically, column (1) estimates 
the factors that determine the probability of a moratorium initially being a legislative 
moratorium (for loans effectively subject to moratoria in 2020). Column (2) analyses 
the impact of these same characteristics on the probability of a return to normal in 
terms of the obligation to meet mortgage payments (i.e. cessation of moratorium). 
Lastly, column  (3) examines the probability of a legislative moratorium being 
transferred to another kind of moratorium. These situations are, by definition, 
restricted to mortgage loans that were subject to moratorium in the period considered. 
In consequence, a total of 264,051 mortgages are considered in column (1), while in 
columns (2) and (3) the analysis is limited to moratoria that were initially legislative, 
i.e. 143,014 loans during the period considered.
6.2.1 Probability of a moratorium being initially legislative
To explain the probability of a moratorium being initially legislative, for loans subject 
to moratorium at any time in 2020, the household, loan and bank characteristics 
variables continue to be relevant. By contrast, the macroeconomic situation in the 
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province ceases to be a determinant factor, reflecting the more dynamic and 
complementary nature of the banking sector moratoria.
As column (1) of Table 3 shows, the income, age and nationality of the household 
reference person, and also whether they are self-employed, are relevant to explain 
the probability of having an initially legislative mortgage payment moratorium. Yet 
their credit history is not relevant here, whereas it was relevant to explain the 
Take-up of initially legislative moratoria is highest among households that were more vulnerable at the start of the pandemic and those that 
were most affected in terms of employment. These households also tend to remain subject to legislative moratoria for longer, or are more 
likely to transfer to other (banking sector or bilateral) moratoria when the former expire. Moreover, loans subject to initially legislative moratoria 
pertaining to more vulnerable households or to those in regions hardest hit by the crisis have a higher probability of being classified as credit 
risk. Interestingly, in the case of the self-employed, although they are more likely to have legislative mortgage moratoria, once these moratoria 
expire the probability of their mortgage loans being classified as non-performing or Stage 2 is no higher.
DETERMINANTS OF INITIALLY LEGISLATIVE COVID-19 MORATORIA AND TRANSFERS
Table 4
SOURCE: Banco de España.
NOTE: The table presents the results of regressions that explain the determinants of the legislative moratoria, and of their change in status, for outstanding 
mortgages at December 2019 that were granted a moratorium in 2020 as a consequence of COVID-19. Column (1) shows the results of estimating a 
linear probability model to explain that a mortgage becomes subject to the COVID-19 legislative moratorium. Columns (2) and (3) show the results 
of a duration model, using a Cox model, where the exit event is expiry of the moratorium (column (2)) or a change of status (column (3)). The first row 
depicts the coefficients; the second row depicts the robust standard deviations in brackets, corrected for the lending bank cluster (columns (2) and (3)) 
and for the mortgaged property postcode cluster (column (1)), followed by the corresponding significance levels: *** significance at 1%, ** significance 









Moratorium expired - loan 
classified as non-performing 
or Stage 2
Initially legislative moratorium 0.075*
(0.043)
**030.0-*440.0-520.0***640.0-)emocni dlohesuoH(goL
(0.012) (0.050) (0.026) 0.0
**030.0-***970.0**370.0-***850.0-)oitar emocni-ot-tbeD(goL
(0.011) (0.033) (0.009) (0.012)
***420.0***932.0*282.0-***521.0-)egA(goL
(0.036) (0.160) (0.043) (0.005)
***890.0110.0-710.0***330.0ngieroF
(0.010) (0.025) (0.014) (0.024)
110.0*950.0530.0-***950.0deyolpme-fleS
(0.015) (0.050) (0.034) (0.008)
910.0***540.0600.0600.0-yrotsih tiderc rooP
(0.015) (0.029) (0.016) (0.014)
110.0-410.0-040.0**610.0etar tseretnI
(0.007) (0.029) (0.021) (0.014)
***820.0**590.0-*180.0***540.0eetnaraug lanosreP
(0.013) (0.043) (0.040) (0.006)
Log(Original maturity (months)) 0.197*** -0.090 0.117 0.28
(0.046) (0.120) (0.096) (0.024)
Mortgage characteristics
Household characteristics
Coefficients expressed in per-unit values
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probability of being subject to a moratorium. This shows that whether households 
have a good or a poor credit history is not a significant factor in the case of 
legislative moratoria. As regards income, the higher the household income, the 
lower the probability of the first payment moratorium of a mortgage in force at end-
2019 being a legislative moratorium in 2020. Specifically, from the first to the third 
income quartile, the average probability of this occurring falls by 5.6%. Moreover, 
the probability of having an initially legislative mortgage payment moratorium in 
2020 is lower for households whose reference person is older. Specifically, the 
average probability is 6.5% lower for households whose reference person is in 
Take-up of initially legislative moratoria is highest among households that were more vulnerable at the start of the pandemic and those that 
were most affected in terms of employment. These households also tend to remain subject to legislative moratoria for longer, or are more 
likely to transfer to other (banking sector or bilateral) moratoria when the former expire. Moreover, loans subject to initially legislative moratoria 
pertaining to more vulnerable households or to those in regions hardest hit by the crisis have a higher probability of being classified as credit 
risk. Interestingly, in the case of the self-employed, although they are more likely to have legislative mortgage moratoria, once these moratoria 
expire the probability of their mortgage loans being classified as non-performing or Stage 2 is no higher.
DETERMINANTS OF INITIALLY LEGISLATIVE COVID-19 MORATORIA AND TRANSFERS (cont'd)
Table 4
SOURCE: Banco de España.
NOTE: The table presents the results of regressions that explain the determinants of the legislative moratoria, and of their change in status, for outstanding 
mortgages at December 2019 that were granted a moratorium in 2020 as a consequence of COVID-19. Column (1) shows the results of estimating a 
linear probability model to explain that a mortgage becomes subject to the COVID-19 legislative moratorium. Columns (2) and (3) show the results of 
a duration model, using a Cox model, where the exit event is expiry of the moratorium (column (2)) or a change of status (column (3)). The first row 
depicts the coefficients; the second row depicts the robust standard deviations in brackets, corrected for the lending bank cluster (columns (2) and (3)) 
and for the mortgaged property postcode cluster (column (1)), followed by the corresponding significance levels: *** significance at 1%, ** significance 









Moratorium expired - loan 
classified as non-
performing or Stage 2
Percentage furloughed workers -0.001 -0.003 0.004* -0.000
(0.001) (0.007) (0.003) (0.001)
***400.0400.0**610.0-300.0etar tnemyolpmenU
(0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.001)
*710.0090.0001.0***690.0-)knab stessA(goL
(0.017) (0.098) (0.086) (0.009)
500.0000.0**621.0-100.0knab/oitar latipaC
(0.008) (0.056) (0.058) (0.006)
**642.0-167.0*251.1-800.0knab AOR
(0.186) (0.621) (0.685) (0.115)
*700.0210.0-***030.0600.0knab/oitar ytidiuqiL
(0.008) (0.009) (0.039) (0.004)
100.0-420.0-0.0800.0-knab/oitar LPN
(0.015) (0.039) (0.065) (0.008)




Number of observations (million)
R2
Coefficients expressed in per-unit values
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the third age-group quartile compared with those whose reference person is in the 
first age-group quartile.22
Regarding the mortgage characteristics, having higher interest rates and longer 
repayment periods and, albeit to a lesser extent, having needed a guarantor, raise 
the probability of having an initially legislative moratorium, whereas having a higher 
debt-to-income ratio reduces the probability, if the loan becomes subject to 
moratorium, of it being a legislative moratorium. 
Specifically, an increase in the mortgage rate from the first interest rate distribution 
quartile to the third (1.6 pp) lifts the average probability of having an initially legislative 
moratorium by 5%, while an extension of the repayment period from the first to the 
third quartile (a difference of some 11 years between the two quartiles) raises the 
average probability of having an initially legislative moratorium by 14%. These results 
are consistent with the fact that in order to be eligible for the legislative moratoria, 
certain conditions relating to households’ difficulties meeting their monthly payment 
obligations – captured by the mortgage interest rate and repayment period – must 
be met.
Turning to bank characteristics, having a mortgage granted by a larger bank (higher 
asset volume) or whose lending business has grown more than the system average 
over the last five years reduces the probability of the mortgage being subject to an 
initially legislative moratorium. Specifically, an increase in the logarithm of total 
assets from the third to the first quartile lifts the probability by 344%, while the fact 
that the bank’s lending business has grown more than the system average over the 
last five years reduces the average probability by 55%.
6.2.2 Probability of an initially legislative moratorium being cancelled
To explain the rate of termination of initially legislative payment moratoria over the 
course of 2020, of the household characteristics variables only age appears to be 
relevant.23 Households whose reference person is older are less likely to return to 
normal; in other words, they remain subject to legislative moratoria for longer. 
Specifically, the average probability of an initially legislative moratorium being 
cancelled is 28.1% lower for households whose reference person is in the third age-
group quartile, compared with those whose reference person is in the first age-
group quartile.
22	 The	sign	of	the	age	coefficient	could	be	capturing	a	lower	initial	level	of	sensitivity	of	older	households’	income	to	
the	COVID-19	shock.	This	could	mean	that	older	households	with	outstanding	mortgages	were	 less	 likely	 to	
satisfy	the	income	conditions	in	order	to	be	considered	vulnerable	households	and,	therefore,	to	be	eligible	to	
apply	for	legislative	moratoria	than	younger	households.
23	 This	may	be	partly	due	 to	 the	characteristics	of	 the	household-level	data	used,	since	 they	 require	 that	each	
household	be	assigned	certain	variables	linked	to	their	postcode.
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Moreover, the higher the household debt-to-income ratio, measured by its logarithm, 
the lower the probability of cancellation of an initially legislative moratorium. Thus, 
from the first quartile to the third quartile of the logarithm of the household debt-to-
income ratio, the average probability of this occurring falls by 27.6%.
The macroeconomic situation of the province seems to have some relevance to 
explain the exit from moratorium. Thus, from a province with an unemployment rate 
in the first quartile to one with an unemployment rate in the third quartile the 
probability of a legislative moratorium expiring falls by 4.1%; that is, these mortgages 
remain subject to legislative moratoria for longer.
Turning to bank characteristics, the probability of initially legislative moratoria being 
cancelled is higher for loans granted by banks with a higher liquidity ratio and lower 
for those granted by banks with a lower capital ratio. Specifically, from the first 
capital ratio quartile to the third, the average probability of this occurring falls by 
123%, whereas in the case of the liquidity ratio the probability rises by 27.6%.
6.2.3  Probability of an initially legislative moratorium being transferred to a 
banking sector moratorium
In this case, both household income and age affect the probability of transfer to 
banking sector or bilateral moratoria, although higher household income reduces 
the probability whereas higher household age increases it.24 A poor credit history is 
also relevant here, as it raises the probability of a legislative moratorium being 
transferred to another type of moratorium by 4.5 pp (some 8.8%). Self-employment 
also raises this probability (although this variable has limited statistical significance).
As regards the effect of the loan characteristics, the household debt-to-income ratio 
and having needed a personal guarantee appear to be the most important variables 
to explain transfer to a banking sector moratorium. The higher the debt-to-income 
ratio, the higher the probability of transfer from an initially legislative moratorium to 
a banking sector or bilateral one. Thus, from the first to the third quartile of the 
logarithm of the household debt-to-income ratio, the probability of this occurring 
increases by 17.7%. Conversely, having needed a personal guarantee reduces the 
probability of transfer to a banking sector moratorium by 9.5 pp (17.5% compared 
with the probability of transfer to another status from a legislative moratorium).
The employment effect, captured by the regional variables, shows that moratoria in 
provinces with a higher percentage of furloughed workers tend to remain in place for 
24	 The	 second	 factor	 reflects	 the	greater	difficulty	 older,	more	 vulnerable	households	 face	 to	 recover	 their	 pre-
pandemic	ability	to	meet	their	payments.
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longer (a 5% increase). In this case, no correlation is observed between lending 
banks’ characteristics and transfer from an initially legislative moratorium.
In consequence, the results appear to suggest that households that have higher 
debt-to-income ratios, are in regions most affected by the pandemic or are lower 
income households tend to remain subject to legislative moratoria for longer or are 
more likely to change to another type of moratoria. 
6.2.4  Probability of loans being classified as non-performing or Stage 2 when 
moratoria expire
In an endeavour to understand the explanatory factors behind the classification of 
loans exiting moratoria, equation [4] has been estimated. The results show that loans 
subject to moratoria that were initially legislative are 33% more likely to be classified 
in a category other than performing. In addition, more vulnerable households (in the 
first quartile of the income distribution) and more indebted households (in the third 
quartile of the debt distribution) have a 9% and 12%, respectively, higher probability 
of being classified in a category other than performing than those in the third or first 
quartile of their respective distributions. Likewise, the average probability of loans 
being classified as non-performing or Stage 2 once the moratoria are no longer in 
place is 12% higher for loans covered by a personal guarantee or pertaining to 
households whose reference person is older (again comparing the third quartile with 
the first quartile). Notably, in the case of the self-employed – despite, as we have 
seen, being more likely to apply for legislative moratoria, reflecting the severe impact 
of the crisis on this group25 – we do not observe a higher probability of their loans 
being classified as Stage  2 or non-performing upon expiry of their mortgage 
moratoria. Lastly, for households in regions hardest hit by the pandemic in terms of 
employment, this probability is 13% higher.
7	 Conclusions
Loan moratoria are one of the support measures for households and firms introduced 
against the backdrop of the crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. They have 
enabled households and firms to defer their loan payment commitments, notably 
enhancing their ability to meet their financial obligations and their available liquidity 
in the near term. 
To date, five different types of loan moratoria have been approved (legislative 
mortgage and non-mortgage moratoria, banking sector moratoria and sector-
specific moratoria for the tourism and transport industries), applicable to different 
25	 See	the	available	evidence	in	Fernández	Cerezo	et	al.	(2021).
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types of loans and borrowers, according to the requirements and conditions set out 
in the corresponding Royal Decree-Laws. 
For these five types of moratoria, lending banks report a specific set of data to the 
Banco de España, which is supplemented by the data obtained through the CCR. 
Drawing on both these sources, some 1.5 million applications for moratoria have 
been made, of which 1.38 million have been granted, a very high acceptance rate 
verging on 93%. The volume of loans subject to moratoria is over €56 billion, which 
is 8% of all existing credit in the eligible loan books.
Most of the borrowers benefiting from the moratoria for individuals (the two legislative 
moratoria and the banking sector moratoria) are wage-earners, who account for 
more than 75% of the total. As for the self-employed who have benefited from the 
moratoria, their main economic sectors are retail, hospitality and other services 
(which together account for 56% of the moratoria granted to the self-employed).
Given that the moratoria had been in operation for almost a year at end-December 
2020, some have expired, as a consequence of discharges, repayments or 
cancellations (reductions in general). The pattern of reductions is very different for 
the different groups of moratoria: for legislative moratoria, given the higher volumes 
granted in April and May 2020, the biggest reductions are in July and August, 
whereas for conventional moratoria, which have a longer duration, the reductions 
come later (specifically half of these reductions, in October and November). 
Considering that the cumulative total under both groups of moratoria is slightly over 
€56 billion, that the cumulative total expired amounts to some €11 billion in each 
group, and that some €15.2  billion have been transferred between groups (loans 
initially subject to legislative moratoria transferred to conventional moratoria, given 
that the shorter duration of the former is conducive to their being transferred, upon 
expiry, to banking sector or bilateral moratoria), at end-December 2020 the loans 
outstanding subject to moratoria amounted to some €34  billion. Conventional 
moratoria accounted for the bulk of this sum (over €32 billion, 95% of the total) and 
legislative moratoria for just some €2 billion (5% of the total outstanding).
As regards the classification of the loans whose moratoria have expired or have 
been cancelled, almost three-quarters are classified as performing, 20% are 
classified as Stage 2 and just 6% are classified as non-performing. Lastly, of the 
outstanding moratoria (over €34 billion), approximately 85% will expire in the first six 
months of 2021, the great majority of which between April and May.
The results of the econometric analysis performed show that the following groups 
record the highest take-up of moratoria: households that were more disadvantaged 
(lower income) or more vulnerable (higher debt) at the start of the pandemic; those 
hardest hit in terms of employment (in provinces with a higher unemployment rate or 
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higher percentage of furloughed workers owing to COVID-19); and those linked to 
the economic sectors most affected by the pandemic (such as retail, hospitality or 
transport). This is consistent with the purpose of these schemes. Moreover, it would 
appear to be the case, above all, among the weakest banks, in terms of lower capital 
ratios or higher NPL rates. Furthermore, the results also appear to suggest that 
vulnerable households, those in regions most affected by the pandemic and lower 
income households tend to be subject to legislative moratoria for longer (or are more 
likely to transfer to non-legislative moratoria when the former expire), and that when 
the moratoria expire, these households’ loans are more likely to be classified as 
Stage  2 or non-performing. All the above highlights the important role that the 
moratoria have played to cushion the initial impact of the pandemic, but also the 
latent risk in moratoria pertaining to more disadvantaged or more highly indebted 
households, which could give rise to higher future provisioning requirements for 
banks. 
To sum up, the analysis performed and the evidence built up in 2020 since the 
moratoria were introduced show that these are flexible support measures that can 
be activated and withdrawn relatively quickly. But they must be used prudently, so 
as to ensure that at the same time as they ease borrowers’ potential liquidity problems 
they also preserve adequate repayment incentives.
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